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Opinion of AG Sharpston (12 December 2013) and Grand Chamber Judgment (12 March 2014) 
in Cases C-456/12 O and B and C-457/12 S and G  
 
The O and B; S and G cases concern the lawful residence of third-country national family members of 
Dutch Union citizens who left the Netherlands. It is the Netherlands where these family members now 
claim residency. The cases were jointly decided on 12 March 2014, but of most interest is the Opinion 
of AG Sharpston delivered three months earlier. The question of TCN family derived rights of residency 
has been a regular feature of the Court’s preliminary rulings over the past years since the seminal 
Zambrano case, testament to the problems concerning a flagrant lack of clarity as to when a legally 
resident Union citizen’s family may invoke fundamental rights. This has become a topic of much 
contention in recent years. This is the reason for a particular interest in the Opinion. AG Sharpston has 
previously requested for the Court to define their clear intentions on whether or not it believes that 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereafter ‘the Charter’) 
and those in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) were free-standing, or if they still 
required the increasingly fictitious cross-border element to be triggered. 1  The post-Zambrano 
developments seemed to have changed AG Sharpston’s tune in the matter, evidenced by this Opinion. 
  
The Charter and free-standing fundamental rights 
The British Advocate General is infamous for her extremely thorough analysis of situations. It is thus 
of no surprise that she takes the opportunity to raise such a number of issues in this Opinion. She begins 
by questioning fundamental rights’ role in citizenship in the context of residency rights and family 
reunification by firstly expressing her disdain for ad hoc solutions. The Court seems to favour this 
method in citizenship (para 44), inciting AG Sharpston’s puzzlement at the fact that there has been such 
an open-ended question remaining as to application of such rights. The possibility that there may now 
be three bases for claiming rights under EU law in citizenship – the rights to free movement and 
                                                          
1 C-60/00 Carpenter [2001] ECR I-6279; C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613; C-384/93 Alpine [1995] 
ECR I-1141 
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residency (Art 21(1) TFEU), the right to privacy and family life (Art 7 Charter) and deprivation of 
genuine enjoyment of EU citizenship rights (Art 20 TFEU) – in her eyes is not the solution. 
 
AG Sharpston makes ‘clear that, at present at least, the Charter does not grant ‘free-standing’ 
fundamental rights’ (para 60). She opines that when the Treaty is triggered by Art 20 or 21 TFEU, 
citizenship has to be ‘Charter-compliant’ (para 62). It is consistent with not extending the scope of EU 
law (something the Charter protects against in Art 51(2)) and also upholds the declaration that 
citizenship is to be the fundamental status of all EU citizens as first mentioned by the Court in Grzelczyk. 
This is provocative because her perspectives on this seem to have changed to be consistent with the 
case law. 
 
Free movement  
AG Sharpston considers that the Citizen’s Rights Directive 2004/38 does not apply because the 
legislation does not cover movement from another Member State back to one’s home Member State 
(para 79). However, she refers instead to Art 21 TFEU, and upholds that restrictions on free movement 
actually extend to impositions as well as negative obligations, in the context of family reunification. 
Referring to Singh and Eind which pre-date the Directive (Singh even predating Union citizenship 
itself), AG Sharpston agrees that the same rights should be granted because ‘the home Member State 
cannot treat its own nationals returning to reside on its territory less favourably than the treatment they 
enjoyed as EU citizens in the host Member State.’ (para 95). 
 
 
Residence 
AG Sharpston notes that the ‘hypothetical prospect’ of triggering rights, whether positively or 
negatively, is insufficient to establish a connection with EU law (para 50). This definitive statement 
translates to a necessary demonstration of legal residency and movement to trigger rights under the 
Treaty. However, she strongly upholds that this idea of length of residence – the duration of which 
differs in the four situations at hand – ‘cannot be applied as an absolute threshold’ though it is a ‘relevant 
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quantitative criterion.’ (para 111). Therefore, it is considered that minimum time spent in residence, 
interruptions to residence (regular or irregular), time spent moving back and forth between Member 
States and reasons for movement (whether as a frontier worker or for contracted employment reasons) 
are all not conclusive in denying third-country nationals derived family rights of residency. 
 
Postscript 
A unique feature of this Opinion comes in the form of a postscript (para 158). Throughout her Opinion, 
AG Sharpston identified several tangential issues to the case which needed attention. Therefore, in her 
postscript, she urges the Court not to ignore these problems, asking them: 
‘to give clear and structured guidance as to the circumstances in which the third 
country national family member of an EU citizen who is residing in his home 
Member State but who is exercising his rights of free movement can claim a derived 
right of residence in the home Member State under EU law.’ 
 
Judgment 
The Court frames the Netherlands’ preliminary ruling as follows: does Directive 2004/38 and Article 
21(1) TFEU prevent a third-country national family member of a Union citizen from deriving residency 
in the Union citizen’s original home Member State after the Union citizen and the family member 
moved away, but have now decided to return? After clarifying in paragraph 37 that the Directive does 
not cover this particular situation (a point AG Sharpston also noted) the Court turns to Article 21(1) 
TFEU and the cases of Singh and Eind which concern similar situations decided pre-Directive. 
Paragraph 55 confirms that the Union citizen has the right to enjoy the same family life in their home 
Member State as they did in their host one, as long as the Union citizen enjoyed a genuine residence 
which created and strengthened their family life. This should not be stricter than the conditions laid out 
in the Directive for derived third-country national family member residence; hence it is applied by 
analogy.  
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In terms of the questions raised and clarification on points of the Directive’s application, the Court is 
very clear and formalistic. They seem to consider the reasons AG Sharpston presented in her Opinion 
for applying the Directive by analogy to the situation at hand. The principle of non-discrimination, 
citizenship and free movement principles underpin the reasoning of the Court. In this sense, the 
judgment resembles a classic decision on Union citizenship finding expression through free movement 
of workers and is relatively uncontroversial. 
 
However, there is an evident disparity in the way AG Sharpston addresses the case and how the Court 
decides to approach it, somewhat indicative of the Court’s hesitance to engage with some of the more 
sensitive and difficult questions the Opinion strongly urged them to clarify (Opinion para 158). The 
bulk of the judgment focuses on the first three questions posed for preliminary ruling which centre 
around Directive 2004/38 and Article 21(1) TFEU’s interpretation of derived residency. Confirming 
that the Directive does not cover situations where the Union citizen rejoins his or her partner in their 
home Member States after leaving, yet the Court extends Article 21(1) TFEU’s scope to protect them 
nonetheless. However, this is the extent of its discussion. 
 
Comment 
Whilst the judgment cannot be overly criticised for its logical approach to questions regarding the 
Directive’s application, it is troubling that yet again, despite AG Sharpston’s gentle request, the Court 
fails to engage with the fundamental rights-citizenship dichotomy. The situation is underlined by her 
unique addition of a postscript, exacerbating the effect of the Court’s decision to ignore this. Though 
the Court has yet to convey their express intentions for the relationship, the AG did in O and B; S and 
G, declaring that fundamental rights are not free-standing. This suggests that she has resolved herself 
to the decisions made in McCarthy and Dereci, sentiments which were not present in her Zambrano 
Opinion. It represents acquiescence to the passive interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty’s fundamental 
rights influence on citizenship, rather than the tacit judicial activism which she previously suggested 
may be a possibility for the Court in the Zambrano Opinion. 
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Because the Court has decided not to address fundamental rights in the judgment and the AG clarified 
that there are no free-standing fundamental rights, there is still legal uncertainty surrounding whether 
the right to private and family life will be enough on its own to grant residency rights for third country 
national family members of Union citizens. Though a link to EU law has been established in the case 
at hand thus requiring consideration of the Charter, the Court does not mention this aspect in its 
judgment. AG Sharpston also called for a ‘Charter-compliant’ holistic consideration of third-country 
national rights of residency. It would appear that though the decision made by the Court is sound, it is 
more what it does not say that is of importance. There is still the unanswered question of when exactly 
fundamental rights will come into play for Union citizens with third country national family members 
when invoking their citizenship rights. It is unclear whether the Court will ever be prepared to give a 
definitive answer to this question, and until then the speculation from Advocates General and 
commentators will build. 
 
 
    Adrienne Yong 
      King’s College London 
